Showing posts with label Political Confucianism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Political Confucianism. Show all posts

Wednesday, April 8, 2009

The Rise of Political Confucianism in Contemporary China

(Note: In June 2008, The China Beat published my commentary "China: Democracy, or Confucianism?", which helped to draw wide attention to Jiang Qing (蒋庆)'s research on Political Confucianism. I learned last week that, an international conference titled "The Origins and Development of Social and Political Reflection in East and West" was held at Uppsala University, Sweden, and Prof. Wang Rui-Chang from Humanities School of the Capital University of Business and Economics presented a paper to explain Political Confucianism more clearly. I'm posting an excerpt of Prof. Wang's presentation with his permission. – Xujun)

The Rise of Political Confucianism in Contemporary China
by Wang Rui-Chang


Abstract: Political Confucianism is a newly emerged school of thought addressing political and social reform in Mainland China. It challenges the current prevalent democratic movement, both inside and outside of China, which proposes governance with legitimacy wholly resting on the ballot. Instead, Political Confucianism advocates the wisdom of “centrality and harmony” contained in Confucianism, especially the Confucian tradition of Gongyang School that flourished in the Han and late Qing dynasties in China. It is aimed at revitalizing Confucianism and reconstructing the politics of the Kingly Way in the modern global context. The present paper is meant to give as clear as possibly a presentation of Political Confucianism to current, especially Western, scholars for critical evaluation.


Background of the Rise of Political Confucianism

Probably anyone who cares about China may have not failed to notice that China is witnessing a revival of Confucianism and traditional culture: more and more scholars come to talk about “national studies”(guoxue); university teachers giving lectures on national television channels become “star scholars” overnight; classics recital classes for children are sprouting up in many parts of the country; thousands of books on Confucianism or traditional culture are piled high and sold well in book stores every day; attending “national studies training class” hosted by the prestigious universities has come to be a fashion for businessmen, civil servants or other part of the more fortunate and affluent part of the population; even the state leaders, as the Canadian political science scholar Daniel A. Bell put it, have also “rediscovered Confucianism."

In 2005, Fang Keli (1938- ), chairman of the Society of the History of Chinese Philosophy, observed:

"Since the May 4th Movement, the New Confucianism movement in modern China has undergone three generations of Confucian scholars and three stages of development. I think, with the 2004 Confucian Conference in Guiyang Yangming Academy ( also known as Summit Conservatism Conference ) as the starting point, the whole New Confucianism movement has now entered on its forth stage, i.e. a stage on which Mainland China Confucians represented by Jiang Qing, Sheng Hong, Kang Xiaoguang, and Chen Ming play the leading role."

In a sense, New Confucianism is a new Neo-Confucianism, a modern version of the Neo-Confucianism as represented by Cheng Hao (1032-1085), Cheng Yi (1033-1107), Zhu Xi (1130-1209), Lu Xiangshan (1139-1193) and Wang Yangming (1472-1529) from Song to Ming Dynasties.

As to the question of politics and social development, the New Confucians unanimously hold the position that China’s traditional political system and the political ideas embodied therein are out of date, and modernization with democracy and science as its true meanings is destined to be China’s political and social future. They argued that although democracy as well as science has been created and developed by westerners in western history, it is rather a “universal instrument” regardless of East or West. Furthermore, democracy, they hold, is actually the inner demand of the logic of Chinese cultural development, it is an instrument by which the ancient sages’ ideal of “making the world under haven impartial and common to all” (tian-xia-wei-gong) could eventually be fulfilled. As the most creative and influential New Confucianism exponent Mou Zongsan put it:

"Modernization takes its origin in the West. However, once it occurs, it is no indigenous product confined to particular countries; as far as it is truth, it is universal. Therefore, every nation must admit it. To put in our old Chinese words, we call it 'the Way of Kingliness', or 'Storing the world in the world itself (letting people themselves rather than emperors decide their own destiny).' To put it in new words, it is 'an open society' or 'democratic politics.' This is a common ideal. For these reasons, although democratic politics originated from the West, we should also realize it according to the requirements of our own inner life."

The New Confucianism flourishing in Taiwan and Hong Kong has exerted strong and durable influence on Mainland China’s intellectual circles since the state of conflict across the Taiwan Strait was lessened and cultural exchange between the two sides became possible when Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978, and at the same time the New Confucian masters have attracted many sincere followers in the Mainland, some of whom are now quite prominent scholars. But in a strict sense, by “Mainland China New Confucianism” we don’t mean the scholarship of this group of followers who just repeat the thoughts of their masters, but the thought of another group of scholars who, though in a more or less degree influenced by the oversea New Confucianism, are more creative in their thought and have gone on a quite different way from their oversea forerunners. In short, the Mainland New Confucianism is not the simple photocopy of the Oversea New Confucianism.

It should also be pointed out that Mainland China New Confucianism is a newly emerged school of thought that is still in its maturing process, and the major scholars under this name actually develop their own thought with no intentional cooperation and they often fail to agree on many issues.

Political Confucianism, on which the present paper is focused, is developed by Jiang Qing, the leading scholar of Mainland China New Confucianism.

The Main Arguments of Political Confucianism
 
1) Division of “Self-cultivation Confucianism” and “Political Confucianism

“Self-cultivation Confucianism” and “Political Confucianism” are a pair of terms first coined by Mr. Jiang Qing to denote the two traditions Jiang himself recognized in Confucianism after Confucius. The two traditions are contrasted with each other in many respects: firstly the former is created out of “existential concern," or “concern of life salvation," while the latter is out of “institutional concern,” or “concern of political legitimacy” ; secondly, holding human nature as innately good, the former approaches the issue of elevating human mind and human nature almost wholly by means of self-cultivation, thus moral improvement being none other than restoring one’s humanity a prior, political and social environment being of little relevance, while the latter, taking a realistic point of view of human nature and deeming it is empirically bad, holds that rituals, institutions and penalties are critically important in improving human nature or keeping men or women from moral degeneration; thirdly, the former is aimed at purifying personal life to become a sage or saint while the latter is directed to the construction of a desirable and stable political system and the betterment of society. In a word, Self-cultivation Confucianism is, by its nature, oriented to the inner life of moral idealism while Political Confucianism is oriented to the outer political structure of social realism.

These two traditions, Jiang argued, are all handed down from Confucius and are equally important. Yet unfortunately, after the Han Dynasty this Political Confucianism of Gongyang Studies was entirely neglected and was buried in complete oblivion, so much so that nowadays scholars equate the teachings of the Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism and the modern oversea New Confucianism with the authentic Confucianism.

2) Theory of Three-Dimensional Political Legitimacy

The central theory of Political Confucianism as advocated by Jiang Qing is the doctrine of political legitimacy. He argues that “political legitimacy” is the foundation of, and the prerequisite to, all political system, political process, political activities and tactics, without which everything political loses its meaning and value.

For Jiang, to be fully legitimate, a political power or regime must simultaneously meet three conditions: 1), it must be at one with, or sanctioned by, the holy, transcendental Tao as expressed or implied in the Confucian Scriptures, and as interpreted by the prestigious Confucian Scholars; 2), it must not deviate from the mainstream of the national cultural heritage and break the historical continuity of the nationality; 3), it must comply with the will or endorsement of the common people.

The first condition is of the divine foundation of a political power, which can be symbolized by Heaven; the second is of historical foundation of a political power, being symbolized by Earth, since national culture and civilization are closely connected with particular regions on the earth; and the third is of the human or secular foundation of a political power, symbolized by Human. This is the so-called “the three dimensions of political legitimacy of the politics of the Kingly Way”, a political idea rooted in traditional Chinese political culture.

The dimension of legitimacy of human will and desire sounds easy to be understood by modern people, especially by Westerners, for it seems similar to the democratic idea that government is legitimate to the extent that it derives from people’s support. But Jiang warns over and over again that this democratic dimension of legitimacy should not have superiority over the other two dimensions. A political system is legitimate if and only if all three dimensions of legitimacy are properly balanced, with no one dimension being superior to the others. Jiang argued, it is the ancient Chinese “middle and harmonious” way of thinking, anchored deeply in the Book of Changes and the Spring and Autumn Annals, that makes this non-linear, tridimensional understanding of political legitimacy possible.

The dimension of historical continuity of nationality is the most disputable one of the three, but Jiang insists that this dimension is indispensible. He cited Edmund Burke’s view to support his stance. As we know, in Burke’s eyes, state is an organic body, politics is the outcome of historical evolution, and thus social heritage, or even prejudices, should be taken with respect. Burke said: “To avoid, therefore, the evils of inconstancy and versatility, ten thousand worse than those of obstinacy and the blindest prejudice, we have consecrated the state, that no man should approach to look into its defects or corruptions but with due caution; that he should never dream of beginning its reformation by its subversion; that he should approach to the faults of the state as to the wounds of a father, with pious awe and trembling solicitude. By this wise prejudice we are taught to look with horror on those children of their country who are prompt rashly to hack that aged parent in pieces and put him into the kettle of magicians, in hopes that by their poisonous weeds and wild incantations they may regenerate the paternal constitutions and renovate their father’s life.” For Jiang Qing, if the state was comparable to a father, then the legitimacy of historical continuity would be comparable to a father’s life blood, which cannot be neglected when considering establishing a political system.

This theory of three-dimensional political legitimacy is meant on the one hand to recognize, and on the one hand to circumscribe, the unbridled selfish human desire, whether of a collective nature or an individual nature, and by this way to create a better pattern of political system for China as well as for the world. For these reasons, Jiang asserts that human history, in a proper sense, has by no means “ended” as Fukuyama claims. On the contrary, it urgently waits to be re-created to avoid the“vital defect”in modern democratic politics.

3) Proposition of Tri-Cameral Legislature

To translate this theory of three-dimensional political legitimacy into realities, Jiang proposes to establish a tri-cameral legislature, with each house representing one dimension of legitimacy.

The House of Profound Confucians (Tong Ru Yuan) represents the legitimacy of the sacred Way, the House of National Continuity (Guo Ti Yuan) represents the legitimacy of cultural heritage and tradition, and the House of Plebeians (Shu Min Yuan) represents the legitimacy of the common people’s will and desire.

The particular way of choosing the members of each house of the legislature, and the mechanisms of check and balance among the three houses, are quite complex and are still under elaboration. Of this I can only give a very brief hint. The members of the House of Profound Confucians are chosen by nomination and appointment by non-governmental Confucian organizations and official Confucian institutions; the members of the House of National Continuity should be representatives of religions (including Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, and Christianity) and descendants of great sages and historical figures. The members of the Plebian House are chosen by elections and functional constituencies. According to Jiang’ s latest opinion in An Explanation of The Diagram of the Kingly Way, The Position of the House of Profound Confucians is the highest, the Plebian House is the lowest, and the House of National Continuity is positioned in between. Bills of great importance must be passed simultaneously by all three. If a bill is passed by all of the three Houses, it is a perfect law. If not, it may be delayed, suspended or vetoed. By dint of this device of tri-cameral legislature the theory of tri-dimensional legitimacy is hoped to be embodied.

4) Restoration of Confucian Religion as the State Religion

Jiang’s Political Confucianism is closely connected with his views about the Religion of Confucianism. For Jiang Confucianism is not merely a theory, not simply a system of abstract ideas, it is a great religion embedded in Chinese civilization, being comparable to Buddhism, Islam and Christianity. In ancient China, Confucianism played a role of state religion. To re-establish China’s political system, Confucianism as a religion is indispensible; it should again be restored as the state religion of China. He writes:

"As a state religion, Confucianism has defined the nature of Chinese civilization, molded the cultural identity of Chinese nation, and shaped the axiological consensus and spiritual convictions of the Chinese people.

In history Confucian religion has performed three functions: first, it provided political legitimacy for Chinese government by laying a transcendental and sacred foundation for politics; second, it provided ethical norms to regulate the social conduct of the Chinese people on the basis of rites; third, it provided religious faith for the people on the basis of transcendental and sacred values as interpreted by the Confucian sages. These three functions are not obsolete in the contemporary world. "

Jiang insists that, being faced with all-round challenges from the West, China must restore Confucian religion in all respects and at all levels. To put in his own words: “It is a task of top priority.”

To be sure, Jiang is against the prevalent idea of total separation of sate and religion, but he takes care not to go so far as to tighten state and religion strictly together as was the case in Middle Ages, or in Tsarist era Russia. But still his proposal to enshrine Confucianism as a state religion is deeply unpopular in China’s intellectual circles, even by some scholars otherwise sympathetic to Confucianism. For example, one of China’s top Confucianism scholars and professor of philosophy at Beijing University Chen Lai, welcomes the new departure in Political Confucianism research conducted by Jiang. In fact, he has helped to have Political Confucianism published. Still, he shook head at the idea that does not separate state and church apart. Their main worry is that other thoughts may be treated as heresies and suffer persecution once Confucianism is set up as state religion. To this Jiang answers:

"In the UK, the Anglican Church, the state religion established by the unwritten English common law, boasts of its privileges; in Northern Europe, the Lutheran church, as the state religion, also boasts of its privileges, In modern Greece, the Eastern Orthodox Church, as the state religion established by the Greek constitution, has its privileges as a rule. But all these countries remain the so-called liberal democratic countries. By the same token, to restore Confucianism as the privileged state religion by no means means spiritual persecution, it only means a certain consensus and unity of the Chinese national spirit and mind. No worry is necessary.”

In fact, the history of China also shows that such worry or fear is groundless.
(Wang Rui-Chang, penname Miwan. Some of his writings in Chinese can be found on http://www.confucius2000.com/writer/miwan.htm)

Wednesday, June 25, 2008

Jiang Qing (蒋庆) on Women and Confucianism

Note: A reader asked, under guest blogger Larry Mongoss's post "Confusion Democracy for China," whether Jiang Qing had written about the role of women. I forwarded the question to Miwan, a student and friend of Jiang Qing's in Beijing, and Miwan pointed me to the transcript of a speech. Jiang Qing seems to take a view that is very consistent with traditional Confucianism. He says somethings that I agree with, and others that I disagree with. I’m posting this for discussion.

The following is my translation of an excerpt from the speech Jiang Qing gave on April 16, 2005, during the "Cultural Dialogue and the Development of Contemporary Academy" forum in Shenzhen, China. The speech was titled "Liberty, Democracy, Three Cardinal Guides, and Feminism." The "Three Cardinal Guides" referred to in the text are: the sovereign guides the subject, the father guides the son, and the husband guides the wife. – Xujun


[In translation] Jiang Qing:

In his speech just now, Professor Tu Weiming views the Three Cardinal Guides as uni-directional, because the sovereign's authority is higher than the subject's, the father's higher than the son's, and the husband's higher than the wife's. Professor Tu asks whether I think the Three Cardinal Guides can be developed further. I think this needs some specific analysis.

Though Confucianism talks about heaven-father and earth-mother, about yin-yang harmony and unity, there must be an absolute, leading role, otherwise the universe would be in disorder.
From the viewpoint of highest philosophy, I-Ching affirms heaven's leading role. But that does not deny the role of the earth. Heaven is the source of the universe's vitality and creation, while earth is life's carrier and undertaker. This is not our subjective assumption; this is the natural order of the universe.

When this natural order of the universe runs through societal and familial relationships, it becomes the Three Cardinal Guides. The relationships are indeed uni-directional, which is the greatest, most positive characteristic of the Guides. We all know that as far as morality is concerned, a moral principle is an absolute command on the actor. It is not a reciprocal or symmetric interpersonal demand. There is no negotiation on morality. To follow the Guides is not to obey a particular person; it is to obey one's own absolute moral obligation.

Therefore, under the requirement of the Three Cardinal Guides, even if the sovereign is unkind, the subject must be loyal; even if the father is unloving, the child must be filial; even if the husband is unjust, the wife must be faithful.

However, the traditional Three Cardinal Guides proscribe the uni-directional morality requirements mainly to the subject, the son, and the wife. From a modern point of view this is a deficit, it is incomplete. The Guides should be supplemented with the uni-directional morality requirements proscribing to the sovereign, the father, the husband as well. This is to require that the sovereign be absolutely kind, regardless whether the subject is loyal; the father be absolutely loving, regardless whether the son is filial; the husband be absolutely just, regardless whether the wife is faithful.

Another layer of the Three Cardinal Guides is that, in each relationship, the guiding party also bears the responsibility. For example, if the son has behavioral problems, the main responsibility is the father's, not the son's.

Confucianism speaks about different roles of husband and wife, but not equality between them. This means man and woman each have a particular role in the social and family order, and that each should realize his or her own value of existence. I really don't understand Western feminism; I think feminism is actually poisoned by masculinism. Why? Because when the universe was created everything was not equal. Absolute equality is not possible and does not exist. Differences and unevenness are natural. A woman's role in family, as in society, is different from a man's. This bears natural rationale.

But Western feminists want everything to be equal between men and women, like the earth fighting the heaven for equality. How can this be possible? If men can do something, women must want to do the same. What is the measurement here? It is men. Feminism uses men's standards to measure women. The feminist is adopting a male value system; she is trying to realize her value by male standards. This disregards the importance of "difference." If a woman really wants to achieve her potential, she should instead realize her unique, particular female value, and not aim at the abstract, general, so-called "equality" that imitates male values.

Confucianism opposes both masculinism and feminism, but advocates gender differences under an orderly heaven-earth universe and harmonious yin-yang unity. Feminism is to be commended for its historical role in opposing overbearing masculinism. However when it goes to the extreme, Confucianism does not agree.

Sunday, June 15, 2008

Confusion Democracy for China

by Larry Mongoss, guest blogger

Xujun’s recent article on The China Beat and the comments it engendered made me think a little bit more about the whole concept of democracy. I can’t help but admire Jiang Qing, he really is a man who believes in his cause, and his cause does seem worthy. His epic search for good governance is reminiscent of both the spiritual search that Siddhartha undertook in search of enlightenment and the adventures of Odysseus.

Of course most people who go off in search of something don’t end up being noticed, let alone becoming Buddha. Much of the trick in making an impact is finding the right stopping place. Had Jiang Qing decided he liked Christianity, or gone on to become a libertarian it is unlikely any would have heard his name again. But, as it happens, he stopped on Confucianism and that does seem to strike a chord with many in China.

While the article itself seems to be more about the man and his journey, the comments all seem focused on his landing point. Few of those who commented embrace the idea of a Confucian state, deriding it as a quaint but impractical, if not simply bad, idea. I share in that skepticism, though not the derision, but it is worth pointing out that what is proposed is quite similar to the evolution of democracy in England and so is not without precedent. Perhaps, if there hadn’t been that pesky communist revolution, Confucianism would have been a nice path to democracy for China, but the cards have changed.

What did strike me strongly in the things Jian Qing said was that popular will alone is not sufficient for good governance. To put this in a more western turn of phrase, how do we protect democracy from the voters?

While that may seem like a tongue in cheek questions, it really is worthy of pretty serious consideration. Iran, Iraq, Russia, Venezuela and Gaza all have governments that have been voted into power by what appear to be a legitimate democratic process. Yet none of those governments behave in a way that most people in the US and Western Europe would think of as democratic.

It is not simply that the people voting don’t understand what is being asked of them. The voting processes in the United States, Japan and other stable democracies are also driven by lots of irrational impulses. Good governance demands more than, and does not really depend upon, good elections. Most, in the US, would point to the constitution as the basis for both governance and law that keeps things right. By that argument, China should also be a thriving democracy. So maybe the constitution has to be strictly adhered to, so that Canada, until 1982 was not really a democracy.

To get good governance, even political stability, you need a clear set of rules that people, by and large, will adhere to. For a democracy with individual freedom, those rules are pretty complicated since they have to let people do mostly what they want but not anything they want. The wealthy democracies have all found their own mix of freedom and restraint managed by both the force of law and social custom. I guess, when you reflect on it, all of this is painfully obvious, and was well understood by people from Cromwell to Jefferson. It was also well understood by Lenin, Mao, Tito, Hussein and Amin who put emphasis on force, though certainly channeling it through social conditioning.

So what does that imply for China? I think the implication is actually that the social conditions for democracy (or perhaps something even better) need to be in place before the new system will work. Those conditions, based on Confucianism or not, need to be engendered by a government that is definitively not democratic. That may seem like an unlikely prospect, but then the current degree of economic and information freedom would have been unthinkable just two decades ago. Let’s just hope that the release of the old state apparatus is timed right – for Mikhail Gorbachev it was too soon, for Saddam Hussein much too late.

Thursday, June 5, 2008

China: Democracy, or Confucianism?

The China Beat, Xujun Eberlein, published: June 3, 2008

Last October, when the CCP held its 17th congress, CNN reported the event with the headline "China rules out copying Western democracy." My first reaction to this headline was, So what? That spontaneous reaction might have been an unconscious consequence of my reading Political Confucianism by Jiang Qing (蒋庆), a contemporary Confucian in China. In this book, Jiang Qing draws a blueprint for China's political future based on Confucianism. It is the first such conception since the 1919 May 4th movement that denounced the traditional Chinese ideology as a feudal relic and began the age-old country's modernization efforts.

It seems typical of American thinking to regard either a republic or parliamentary democracy as absolutely the only right model for all countries. For a political system to succeed, however, it needs to be rooted in the particular country's cultural history. Throughout thousands of years, China has never lacked great thinkers, political or philosophical. Which poses an interesting question: why does China need to adopt a Western model for its political system, be it Marxist communism or capitalist democracy? Read the complete article on The China Beat